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CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON FEDERAL COURT
ASSERTIONS OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
Pamela J. Stephens*
I. INTRODUCTION
Twenty years ago, in a clear break with accepted theory, it was
suggested that there were certain constitutional limitations on a
federal court's authority to exercise personal jurisdiction.' Such a
departure from the traditional view might be expected to prompt
an extensive examination of that issue by commentators. However,
while assertions of personal jurisdiction by state courts have been
the subject of intense scrutiny and ongoing constitutional refine-
ments,2 this has not been the case regarding assertions of personal
jurisdiction by federal courts. Generally, federal district courts sit-
ting in diversity cases must look to personal jurisdiction limita-
tions inherent in the state long arm statute where the federal court
Associate Professor of Law, Vermont Law School; B.A., 1971, Ohio State University;
J.D., 1975, University of Cincinnati.
1. According to Professor Gerald Abraham:
If a defendant is forced to litigate in the courts of a distant state with which he has
had no contact, it is considered so unfair to him as to offend the "traditional notions
of fair play and substantial justice" embodied in the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Might it not also be unfair to force him to litigate in the federal
court across the street? Might this unfairness not offend the "traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice" embodied in the due process clause of the fifth
amendment?
Abraham, Constitutional Limitations Upon the Territorial Reach of Federal Process, 8
VLL. L. REV. 520, 533-34 (1963).
2. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Super. Ct., 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Jay, "Minimum
Contacts" as a Unified Theory of Personal Jurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59 N.C.L. REv. 429
(1981); Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an Era, 53 N.Y.U. L. REv. 33 (1978).
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is located. This requirement is viewed as a statutory and perhaps
constitutional mandate.3 Otherwise, federal courts which exercise
federal question jurisdiction, or entertain issues where Congress
has provided for nationwide service of process, suffer from no due
process limits on their extraterritorial assertions of personal juris-
diction.4 Given the historical development of state court personal
jurisdiction, with its increased emphasis on the fairness and rea-
sonableness of asserting jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant,
it seems logically inconsistant that there has been no correspond-
ing development with regard to the federal courts to protect the
interest of a defendant who resides far from the federal forum or
who lacks a substantial relationship to that forum. This article will
explore the history of personal jurisdiction doctrine in this coun-
try. The article then will address the concerns which indicate that
the fifth amendment to the United States Constitution compels
considerations in federal courts similar to those considerations the
fourteenth amendment imposes upon state courts. This article will
also suggest that judicial failure to impose such limitations on fed-
eral personal jurisdiction is based upon rejected notions of "power"
and "territoriality." Because state court personal jurisdiction de-
terminations have been the principal arena for development of per-
sonal jurisdiction doctrine in this country, the article will first ad-
dress those determinations. Since the development of state court
personal jursidiction doctrine has been comprehensively dealt with
elsewhere, 5 however, it will be dealt with only briefly herein.
3. Compare Clermont, Restating Territorial Jurisdiction and Venue for State and Fed-
eral Courts, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 411, 457 n.1 (1981) with Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l,
320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963) and Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations
in Diversity Actions: A Tiltyard for the Knights of Erie, 31 U. Cm. L. REV. 752 (1964)
(exploring application of a congressionally authorized federal standard in diversity actions).
4. D. LOUISELL & G. HAZARD, PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 171, 171-72 (4th ed. 1979) (quot-
ing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGEMENTS § 7 comment f (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978)) ("At
least within the territorial limits of the United States, the territorial jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts is restricted only because of the constitutional restrictions on state court jurisdic-
tion have been incorporated by reference in the legislation governing the federal courts.").
But cf. Abraham, supra note 1.
5. For a comprehensive discussion of the development of personal jurisdiction doctrine in
this country, see Silberman, supra note 2, at 39.
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II. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN
STATE COURTS
A. The Classic View
The development of personal jurisdiction theory in this country
is generally dated from the Supreme Court's decision in Pennoyer
v. Neff.' Justice Field's majority opinion identified three categories
of judicial action: 1) in rem, a proceeding which purports to resolve
the rights of all persons to a thing;7 2) quasi in rem, an action
which concerns the interests of particular persons in a thing;8 and
3) in personam, an action in which a court may impose personal
liability or obligation upon the defendant.9 The theoretical basis
for asserting personal jurisdiction in each of these categories was,
according to Justice Field, the "power" or "territoriality" theory of
jurisdiction. This theory, in turn, rested upon two other accepted
principles of public law.' 0
The first of these principles was that "every State possesses ex-
clusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory."'1 The second principle was that "no tribunal
established by [a state] can extend process beyond [its] territory so
as to subject either persons or property to its decisions."' 2 As a
result of adopting this theoretical framework for state court per-
sonal jurisdiction, a very rigid territorial rule developed. If a per-
son or his property could be found within a state's boundaries, as-
sertion of jurisdiction of a court of that state was proper;
otherwise, assertion of jurisdiction was improper.13
The development of quasi in rem jurisdiction remained consis-
tent with Pennoyer's explanation of the theoretical underpinnings
of state jurisdiction. 4 Attachment of a defendant's property in the
forum state was often the only means by which a plaintiff forum
6. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
7. Id. at 724-26.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 722.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 722-23 (quoting J. STORY, CONFLICrS OF LAWS § 539 (1834)) ("Any exertion of
authority of this sort beyond this limit. . . is a mere nullity, and incapable of binding such
persons or property in any other tribunals.").
14. See, e.g., Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank, 243 U.S. 269 (1917); Harris v. Balk, 198
U.S. 215 (1905); Wilcox v. Richmond Fredericksburg & P.R.R., 270 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y.
1967).
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resident could obtain satisfaction against an absent nonresident
defendant, short of following the defendant to another state. 15 The
application of the power theory in quasi in rem cases reached what
is generally considered to be its high-water mark in the 1905 case
of Harris v. Balk."
The consequence of the holding in Harris that a "debt follows
the debtor" greatly expanded the number of forums in which juris-
diction could be obtained over a nonresident defendant by attach-
ing his property in the state.' 7 Harris was the rule with regard to
quasi in rem jurisdiction until very recently.'
In personam jurisdiction, however, from its inception, deviated
from pure sovereignty notions. Exceptions to the strict rule an-
nounced in Pennoyer were recognized within the opinion itself.' 9
Later cases have amended the Pennoyer rule, particularly with re-
gard to nonresident corporate defendants.20
The major change in the Supreme Court's analysis of in per-
sonam assertions of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defen-
dants came in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.2 While
viewed by some as merely supplementing the power theory, the
case is more correctly viewed as a redefinition of the theoretical
basis of state court personal jurisdiction.22 The Supreme Court de-
15. Beale, The Exercise of Jurisdiction in Rem to Compel Payment of a Debt, 27 H~Av.
L. REV. 107 (1913); Carpenter, Jurisdiction Over Debts for the Purpose of Administration,
Garnishment and Taxation, 31 HARV. L. REV. 905 (1918).
16. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). The Supreme Court upheld a Maryland court's assertion of quasi
in rem jurisdiction over an absent nonresident defendent, Balk, by attaching a debt owed to
Balk by Harris, who was passing through Maryland. Id. at 217.
17. For an example of the extreme to which the Harris doctrine was taken, see Seider v.
Roth, 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966) (The New York Court of
Appeals upheld personal jurisdiction based on the attachment of a contractual obligation
running from an insurance company doing business in New York to the defendant, a nonres-
ident insured.). But see Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980) (holding the Seider doctrine
to represent an unconstitutional assertion of personal jurisdiction).
18. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
19. The Pennoyer Court recognized that cases "affecting the personal status of the plain-
tiff," i.e., domestic relations cases and "cases in which [substituted] service may be consid-
ered to have been assented to in advance," fell outside the rule. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733.
20. See Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Personam
Jurisdiction of State Courts - From Pennoyer To Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv.
569 (1958). For an extension of the Pennoyer doctrine in a nonresident motorist context, see
Hess v. Pawlowski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
21. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
22. In International Shoe, Washington State sought to collect from International Shoe
Co., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Missouri, unpaid unem-
ployment compensation taxes. The corporation's only business in Washington consisted of
[Vol. 18:697
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clined to adopt an "implied consent" or "doing business" theory23
to support the assertion of jurisdiction over the International Shoe
Co. Instead, the Supreme Court, looking to the fourteenth amend-
ment, found that due process requires a defendant to have "mini-
mum contacts" with the state. Further, the Supreme Court found
that these "minimum contacts" must be of the nature and quality
which make the forum's assertions of jurisdiction just and reasona-
ble in light of "traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice." '24
Although couched in terms of "contacts, '25 International Shoe's
emphasis was clearly upon the reasonableness and fairness of a
state's assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.2 The
Supreme Court, however, was not prepared to abandon sovereignty
as an element of personal jurisdiction.
In Hanson v. Denckla,27 the Supreme Court again indicated that
sovereignty is an element of personal jurisdiction.2s The Court, in
finding that Florida courts lacked jurisdiction over a Delaware
trustee, characterized the "minimum contacts" standards as a
"consequence of the territorial limitations on the power of the re-
employing eleven to thirteen salesmen who solicited orders which were accepted and filled
from St. Louis. Id. at 311-13.
23. Id. at 317-18.
24. Id. at 316.
25. Contacts is a term with obvious territorial connotations. See supra note 5 and accom-
panying text.
26. See International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 317 (citing Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert,
Inc., 425 F.2d 139, 141 (2d Cir. 1930)) ("An 'estimate of the inconveniences' which would
result to the corporation from a trial away from its 'home' or principal place of business is
relevant in this connection."). See also McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220
(1957) (Nonresident company met minimum contacts standard based upon the residency of
the insured; the fact that the policy was mailed into the state; and that premiums were
mailed from the state asserting jurisdiction); Gray v. American Radiator Standard Sanitary
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, -, 176 N.E.2d 761, 765 (1961) ("trend in defining due process of law
is away from the emphasis on territorial limitations and toward emphasis on providing ade-
quate notice and opportunity to be heard ... toward the court in which both parties can
most conveniently settle their dispute").
27. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
28. Hanson involved a dispute between certain residuary legatees under a will executed in
Florida by a Florida resident and beneficiaries of a Delaware trust, who were to receive trust
funds by virtue of an exercise of a power of appointment by deceased. The Florida legatees
were claiming that the power had been ineffectively exercised and, therefore, the remainder
of the Delaware trust should pass to them under the will's residuary clause. Personal service
could not be made on the Delaware trustee in Florida, so substituted service, by mail and
publication, was used. Defendants challenged the Florida court's power to assert personal
jurisdiction over the trustee who conducted no business in that state. Id. at 238-42.
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spective States. '29 Hanson held that "it is essential in each case
that there be some act by which the defendant purposefully avails
itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws. '30
Thus, it was clear that while fairness and reasonableness were in-
creasingly relevant considerations in a personal jurisdiction deter-
mination, issues of territoriality and sovereignty continued to exert
a strong influence. 31
B. The Modern View
Although the development of quasi in rem and in personam ju-
risdictional doctrines took very different paths after Pennoyer,'32
the Supreme Court drew them together again in Shaffer v. Heit-
ner." Shaffer questioned the constitutionality of Delaware's se-
questration statute. 4 The statute allowed Delaware courts to as-
sert jurisdiction by sequestering a defendant's property located in
Delaware.35 Plaintiff Heitner filed a shareholder's derivative suit
against twenty-eight present or former officers and directors of the
Delaware-based Greyhound Corporation.'6
Delaware has a unique statutory provision which places the situs
of stock ownership of all Delaware corporations in Delaware. 7
Since twenty-one of the named defendants owned stock or stock
options in the Greyhound Corporation, Heitner moved, pursuant
to Delaware procedure, for an order of sequestration.' a The Dela-
29. Id. at 251.
30. Id. at 253 (citing International Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 319).
31. See Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251. ("However minimal the burden of defending in a foreign
tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so unless he has had the 'minimum
contacts' with that State that are a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.").
32. See Silberman, supra note 2.
33. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
34. Id. at 189. See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
35. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 366 (1975).
36. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 189-90. Heitner claimed a violation of fiduciary duties arising out
of actions that were the basis for an antitrust judgment and a criminal contempt fine
against the two companies. The events which led to the antitrust judgment occurred in Ore-
gon, the criminal contempt fine was rendered in Illinois. Id. at 190 nn.2 & 3. See also United
States v. Greyhound Corp., 370 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Ill.), aff'd, 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1974).
37. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 169 (Repl. Vol. 1983) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all
Courts held in this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the owner-
ship of the capital stock of all corporations existing under the laws of this State,
whether organized under this chapter or otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
38. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 191-92.
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ware courts upheld the assertion of jurisdiction, 9 noting that the
presence of defendants' property in the state of Delaware allowed
the court to assert quasi in rem jurisdiction without regard to the
minimum contacts test.
40
Contrary to the Delaware courts' expectations, the Supreme
Court reversed, finding the minimum contacts standard applicable
to quasi in rem actions. The Court held that when property, which
is completely unrelated to the plaintiff's cause of action, serves as a
basis for state court jurisdiction, the standard set forth in Interna-
tional Shoe is not satisfied.41 Having established that the mini-
mum contacts standard of International Shoe was to govern all
state court assertions of personal jurisdiction,42 the Court subse-
quently decided three cases which further delineated this standard
and its conceptual foundation.43
In the most important of these cases, World-Wide Volkswagen
Corp. v. Woodson,44 the Supreme Court appeared to reject the con-
tentions of those courts and commentators who read Shaffer as a
clear move away from sovereignty as a rationale for personal juris-
diction. In World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court made it clear that
the "minimum contacts" concept performs
two related, but distinguishable functions. It protects the defendant
against the burdens of litigating in a distant or inconvenient forum.
And it acts to ensure that the States, through their courts, do not
reach beyond the limits imposed on them by their status as coequal
sovereigns in a federal system.45
39. Id. at 194. See also Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225 (Del. 1976).
40. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 195 (citing Greyhound Corp., 361 A.2d at 229).
41. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 213.
42. Id. at 212 ("We . . . conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be
evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.").
43. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Rush v. Savchuk,
444 U.S. 320 (1980); Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
44. 444 U.S. 286 (1980). In Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978), the Supreme
Court had already moved away from any such liberal reading of Shaffer. Kulko was a child
custody and support case in which California asserted personal jurisdiction over a New York
resident. The California Supreme Court held that due process requirements were satisfied
by virtue of Mr. Kulko's purposefully availing himself of the benefits and protections of
California by voluntarily sending his daughter into the state to live with her mother. Kulko,
19 Cal. 3d 514, 564 P.2d 353, 138 Cal. Rptr. 586 (1977), rev'd, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). The
United States Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Kulko's activities and any "effects"
which those activities may have caused in the state were insufficient "contacts" in the juris-
dictional sense. Kulko, 436 U.S. at 92.
45. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 291-92.
1984]
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The Court further indicated that the sovereignty function is to op-
erate as a threshold concern before issues of fairness will be
reached. While acknowledging the importance of protecting defen-
dants from burdensome litigation,46 the Court stated that this
function will not override the federalism concern.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience
from being forced to litigate before the tribunals of another State;
even if the forum State has a strong interest in applying its law to
the controversy; even if the forum state is the most convenient loca-
tion for litigation, the Due Process Clause, acting as an instrument
of interstate federalism, may sometimes act to divest the State of its
power to render a valid judgment.47
The Court concluded that the Oklahoma court's assertion of juris-
diction was unconstitutional in light of the defendants' failure to
"purposefully avail [themselves] of the privilege of conducting ac-
tivities within the forum State." '48 Only passing mention was made
of the reasonableness of Oklahoma's assertion of jurisdiction.49
C. Current State of the Law
The Supreme Court's recent decisions suggest, despite the hopes
of some commentators and courts, ° that the Court has not moved,
and has no present intention of moving, to a purely "fairness" ori-
ented analysis. 1 In addition to fairness, and perhaps as a threshold
consideration, the Court requires defendant's actual connection or
affiliation with the forum state-a purposeful availment of the
benefits and protections of that forum state."2
In light of this apparent consistency in the Court's recent opin-
ions, its decision in Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des
Bauxites De Guinee53 is difficult to understand. In this case, the
46. Id. at 292.
47. Id. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251, 254 (1958)).
48. Id. at 297-99 (quoting Hanson, 357 U.S. at 253).
49. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 292. See also Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S.
320 (1980) (quasi in rem jurisdiction could not be based solely upon the fact that the non-
resident defendant's insurance policy was issued by a company doing business in that state).
See supra note 17 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Seider doctrine as rejected
in Rush.
50. See infra notes 56-78 and accompanying text.
51. See Clermont, supra note 3.
52. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
53. 456 U.S. 694 (1982).
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district court had, as a rule 37(b)(2)(A) sanction for defendants'
failure to comply with a discovery order, entered an order which
assumed the forum's personal jurisdiction over defendants. 4 The
Supreme Court, apparently relying on the theory that lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction is a waivable defense, found that the defendants'
actions constituted a waiver, and upheld the district court's
holding. 5
The Court's opinion contains some very interesting language
which appears to modify the standard recently applied in Rush v.
Sarchuck and World-Wide Volkswagen:
The restriction on state sovereign power described in World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp., however, must be seen as ultimately a function
of the individual liberty interest preserved by the Due Process
Clause. That Clause is the only source of the personal jurisdiction
requirement and the Clause itself makes no mention of federalism
concerns. Furthermore, if the federalism concept operated as an in-
dependent restriction on the sovereign power of the court, it would
not be possible to waive the personal jurisdiction requirement: In-
dividual actions cannot change the power of sovereignty, although
the individual can subject himself to powers from which he may
otherwise be protected.6
This language seems contrary to other recent Supreme Court opin-
ions, particularly World-Wide Volkswagen which clearly estab-
lishes the federalism concept as an independent restriction on the
state courts' power. 57
Justice Powell's concurrence recognizes the majority's departure
from accepted personal jurisdiction doctrine which includes the
notion that "'[m]inimum' contacts represent[s] a constitutional
prerequisite to the exercise of in personam jurisdiction over an un-
consenting defendant." 58 An assertion of personal jurisdiction, ab-
sent such a showing of purposeful contacts would, in Justice Pow-
ell's view, "[a]ppear to transgress previously established
constitutional limitations. ' 59 Justice Powell further states that:
54. Id. at 699. Defendants had failed to supply information relating to their contacts with
the forum.
55. Id. at 705-07.
56. Id. at 703 n.10 (emphasis added).
57. See 444 U.S. at 291-92; see also infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
58. 456 U.S. at 712.
59. Id. at 713.
1984] 705
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By finding that the establishment of minimum contacts is not a pre-
requisite to the exercise of jurisdiction. . . the Court may be under-
stood as finding that "minimum contacts" no longer is a constitu-
tional requirement for the exercise by a state court of personal
jurisdiction over an unconsenting defendant. Whenever the Court's
notions of fairness are not offended, jurisdiction apparently may be
upheld.60
Justice Powell also reads the majority opinion as "[flor the first
time. . . defin[ing] personal jurisdiction solely by reference to ab-
stract notions of fair play." 6' As tempting as it is to read Insurance
Corp. of Ireland as Justice Powell does, the case is most likely lim-
ited to its specific facts.2
Thus, in state assertions of in personam and quasi in rem juris-
diction, we are left with a due process test which requires both
purposeful contact with the forum state by a nonresident defen-
dant and fair and reasonable assertions of personal jurisdiction by
the forum state in light of competing interests. One or the other,
by itself, is insufficient. The Court has never held that purposeful
availment, in the absence of fairness and reasonableness, is suffi-
cient to justify personal jurisdiction over the nonresident.
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN FEDERAL COURTS
The issue of personal jurisdiction in the federal courts has been
subjected to much less analysis by courts and commentators than
the state court concerns. 3 Views on assertion of personal jurisdic-
tion in federal court more often reflect dicta from Supreme Court
opinions. For example, in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Mur-
phree,64 the Court noted that "[C]ongress could provide for service
of process anywhere in the United States."6 5 However, the Su-
60. Id. at 713-14.
61. Id. at 714.
62. See id. at 703 n.10 for the statement of the Court that
[c]ontrary to the suggestion of Justice Powell ... our holding today does not alter
the requirement that there be "minimum contacts" between the nonresident defen-
dant and the forum state. Rather, our holding deals with how the facts needed to
show those "minimum contacts" can be established when a defendant fails to comply
with court ordered discovery.
63. See supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
64. 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
65. Id. at 442. See also Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619, 622 (1925); United
States v. Union Pac. R.R., 98 U.S. 569, 604 (1878); Toland v. Sprague, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 300,
328 (1838).
706 [Vol. 18:697
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preme Court has neither squarely addressed this issue, nor has it
ruled out the possibility of fifth amendment limitations on asser-
tions of personal jurisdiction over particular defendants, even
though Congress may provide for nationwide service of process.
Constitutional limitations upon assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion by a federal court may arise in two contexts. First, there are
those diversity or federal question cases in which rule 4 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure applies. Rule 4 provides that personal
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants is to be asserted in accor-
dance with the state law of the jurisdiction in which the federal
district court is located.6 The second context involves cases in
which Congress has provided or may provide for nationwide, or
other more limited, extraterritorial service of process.6 Both of
these contexts will be explored below.
A. Rule 4 Limitations on the Exercise of Personal Jurisdiction
Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that
in cases involving a party who is "not an inhabitant of or found
within the state in which the district court is held" and involving a
cause of action for which no specific federal service is provided, the
district court may serve process in accordance with any existing
federal statute, or in lieu of such statute, in accordance with the
applicable state statute or state rule in which the district court
sits.6 8 Federal circuit courts which have considered the application
of rule 4(e) are in unanimous agreement that, absent an applicable
federal rule or statute, rule 4(e) requires them to look to the state
long arm statute.6 9
There are two principal consequences of this general view. First,
accessibility to federal courts may vary from state to state, de-
66. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
67. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 5,
26 Stat. 210); 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982) (originally enacted as Act of Oct. 15, 1914, ch. 323, § 12,
38 Stat. 736); 28 U.S.C. § 2321 (1982). The term "extraterritorial" as used in this article
refers to service of process outside the state in which a federal district court sits.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e).
69. See Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963); Stanza v. McCor-
mick Shipping Corp., 268 F.2d 544 (5th Cir. 1959); L.D. Reeder Contractors of Ariz. v. Hig-
gins Indus. Inc., 265 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1959); Electrical Equip. Co. v. Daniel Hamm Drayage
Co., 217 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1954); Partin v. Michaels Art Bronze Co., 202 F.2d 541 (3rd Cir.
1953); Canvas Fabricators, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons, Co., 199 F.2d 485 (7th Cir.
1952); Steinway v. Majestic Amusement Co., 179 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1949); Pulson v. Ameri-
can Rolling Mill Co., 170 F.2d 193 (1st Cir. 1948).
1984] 707
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pending on differences in long arm statutes which represent only
the state legislature's view of how best to protect state interests.70
Second, many courts applying state long arm statutes have as-
sumed they must apply the statutes subject to fourteenth amend-
ment due process limitations. 71 This interpretation of rule 4(e),
mandating application of state long arm statutes, effectively pre-
cludes adoption of a uniform federal standard.
Some courts apparently feel compelled to apply state long arm
statutes only as a result of what they perceive to be a congressional
mandate. 72 Those courts view rule 4(e) as imposing such a man-
date, except in those few cases where Congress has expressly pro-
vided for a different rule.73 Judicial pronouncements may not over-
rule Congress' evident intent that district courts exercise personal
jurisdiction in accordance with state law in most cases involving
nonresident defendants.74 Nonetheless, courts following such a rule
do not necessarily find it to be compelled by the Constitution. For
example, the Second Circuit has "fully concede[d] that the consti-
tutional doctrine announced in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins . . . .
would not prevent Congress or its rule making delegate from au-
thorizing a district court to assume jurisdiction over a foreign cor-
poration in an ordinary diversity case, although the state court
would not [assume jurisdiction]. '75
Other courts, however, with support from commentators, indi-
cate that the Erie doctrine76 requires deference to state law at least
with regard to state created claims.77 As one commentator con-
cluded, "[t]oday Erie requires a federal court, on a state-created
70. "[C]ongress' failure to enact a general federal question competence statute has the
result of bringing up to bear on federal claims, to which federalism concerns have no rele-
vance, individual state legislatures' decisions in effect to protect out of state defendants
from suit on state law claims." De James v. Magnificence Carriers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 293
(3rd Cir.) (Gibbons, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
71. See, e.g., Arrowsmith v. United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219, 222 (2d Cir. 1963).
72. Id. at 226.
73. Id.
74. Id. ("[Wie find no federal policy that should lead federal courts in diversity cases to
override valid state laws as to the subjection of foreign corporations to suit, in the absence
of direction by federal statute or rule.").
75. Id.
76. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see also Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S.
460 (1965); Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
77. See, e.g., National Equip. Rental Co. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964) (Black, J., dis-
senting); Comment, Federal Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations and the Erie Doctrine,
64 COLUM. L. REV. 685 (1964).
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claim and in the absence of a federal statutory directive or rule, to
apply the state's 'jurisdictional' law . . .
In view of cases which further explained the Erie doctrine and
its rationale, this author is persuaded that no constitutional basis
exists for the rule 4(e) provision.7  Therefore, Congress is free to
modify rule 4(e) to allow imposition of a uniform federal rule re-
garding personal jurisdiction. Even if Erie does, on some constitu-
tional basis, require the application of rule 4(e) in a diversity
case,80 that requirement would have no relevance to federally cre-
ated claims and Congress could therefore change rule 4 with re-
spect to such claims.
B. Extraterritorial or Nationwide Service of Process
Congress has expressly provided, in the context of narrow statu-
tory schemes, for nationwide service of process.8 ' Congress has also
provided in The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 4(f) for a more
limited form of extraterritorial service, i.e. service outside a state
in which the acting federal district court sits.82 Rule 4(f) allows for
service of process on parties brought into a case pursuant to rule
14 impleader, or on parties necessary for just adjudication pursu-
ant to rule 19, "at all places outside the state but within the
United States that are not more than 100 miles from the place in
which the action is commenced. ' 83 This so-called "bulge" provision
was added to the Federal Rules in 1963,84 along with language
which sought to "assure the effectiveness of service outside the ter-
ritorial limits of the State in all cases in which any of the rules
authorize service beyond those boundaries."8
In addition to these rather narrow examples of congressional
78. Clermont, supra note 3, at 457.
79. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (the Court weighed the
federal court's interest in applying its own federal procedural rule).
80. The Erie doctrine generally applies only in diversity cases or other cases which in-
volve state law claims. "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the [s]tate." Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
81. See supra note 67; see also 40 U.S.C. § 270(b) (1982); 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982); 2 J.
MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 4.42 (2d ed. 1982).
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f).
83. Id.
84. Rule 4(f), as originally promulgated, provided that "[a]ll process other than a sub-
poena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district
court is held and, when a statute of the United States so provides, beyond the territorial
limits of that state." FED. R. Civ. P. 4(f), 28 U.S.C.A. 4(f) (West 1960).
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 4().
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willingness to extend the reach of federal process beyond state
lines, there have been various proposals advocating that Congress
make use of what proponents presume is the power to provide for
nationwide service of process.86 The American Law Institute, a
chief proponent, has offered a plan for a sweeping change in the
assertion of personal jurisdiction in federal courts.8 7 According to
the ALI proposal, nationwide service of process would be the norm
in federal question cases with the limitation that suit may be
brought only where a "substantial part" of the events occurred,
where property in the suit is situated, or in the state where all de-
fendants reside.8 In diversity cases, the ALI retains the rule 4
scheme, thereby leaving the issue of personal jurisdiction to state
law.89 The ALI, however, offers little explanation or authority for
the position it takes.90
Courts and scholars have, for the most part, persisted in elevat-
ing Supreme Court dicta to an axiom: There are no due process
limitations on congressional power to provide for nationwide ser-
vice of process.' However, this view is not without its critics.9 2 As
the preceding portion of this article illustrates, the Supreme Court
has moved away from a strict territorial/sovereignty approach to
state court jurisdiction toward a standard which also requires that
a state court's exercise of jurisdiction be reasonable.9 3 In accor-
dance with this shift of emphasis from sovereignty to reasonable-
ness, some district courts have suggested that a reasonableness
component be added to the federal courts' personal jurisdiction
86. See, e.g., Barrett, Venue and Service Process in the Federal Courts-Suggestions for
Reform, 7 VAND. L. REV. 608 (1954); Green, Federal Jurisdiction In Personam of Corpora-
tions and Due Process, 14 VAND. L. REV. 967 (1961); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY ON
THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTIONS BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS (1969) [hereinafter
cited as ALl STUDY].
87. ALI STUDY, supra note 86, §§ 2371, 2373-74.
88. Id. §§ 2371, 2373.
89. Id. § 2374.
90. See id. § 2374, at 437-41, Supporting Memorandum B (states the ALI's assumptions
that due process does not restrict assertions of personal jurisdiction citing to the Supreme
Court dicta in Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946)).
91. See Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455
U.S. 949 (1982); Stern v. Gobeloff, 332 F. Supp. 909, 912-14 (D. Md. 1971); First Flight Co.
v. National Car Loading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736 (E.D. Tenn. 1962); Barrett, supra note
86; Green, supra note 86.
92. See, e.g., Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816, 826 (6th Cir. 1981) (Keith, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 949 (1982); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.,
372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
93. See supra notes 26-88 and accompanying text.
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considerations. 94 The source of this component is the due process
clause of the fifth amendment. Drawing a parallel to the four-
teenth amendment restrictions on assertions of personal jurisdic-
tion, those courts would find such limitations applicable to the fed-
eral courts based upon the fifth amendment.9 5
The most commonly cited formulation of that limitation is found
in Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp.,9" a securities
fraud case brought in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania by a Philadelphia corporation against nonres-
ident shareholders. Service of process was made in California pur-
suant to a federal securities act permitting nationwide service of
process.9 7 Defendants moved to dismiss the case for want of in per-
sonam jurisdiction, arguing that they lacked the minimum contacts
necessary to meet due process requirements.98
The district court addressed the jurisdictional issue directly,
characterizing it as "the vexatious questions of whether there exist
due process limitations upon the congressional grant of [nation-
wide] extraterritorial service under the securities acts and other
acts." '99 The court first noted that "[m]ost courts and commenta-
tors assume or find some federal due process limits on federal ser-
vice of process" but those minimal limits are often seen as served
by proper notice requirements or venue provisions. 100 The court
also discussed prior cases which rejected an application of the In-
ternational Shoe standard to federal assertions of personal juris-
diction.101 The Oxford First Corp. court pointed out that those
cases advance the outdated view that "the concept of personal ju-
risdiction is based primarily on the principle of territorial sover-
eignty and not on the notion of procedural fairness or substantial
justice found in the due process doctrine.' 0 2
94. See, e.g., Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th Cir.
1954); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974);
Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 319 F. Supp. 1256 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), va-
cated on other grounds, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972).
95. See, e.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
96. 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 196.
99. Id. at 198.
100. Id. at 198-99.
101. Id. at 199.
102. Id.
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The Oxford First Corp. court rejected the view that there are no
constitutional limitations upon extraterritorial service of process
under federal statutes, stating, "the existence of the fifth amend-
ment would indicate otherwise."' ' The court found there to be
constitutional restrictions, but held that they did not necessarily
parallel the due process restrictions on state courts as defined by
International Shoe. 04 The court defined its fairness test in terms
of defendant's contacts with the particular federal forum, the in-
convenience to defendant of defending in that jurisdiction, judicial
economy, situs of discovery proceedings and the nature of the ac-
tivities giving rise to the claim. 0 5 Applying this standard to the
facts of the case, the Oxford First Corp. court upheld the exercise
of personal jurisdiction. 10 6
Other courts, after Oxford First Corp., have held that the fifth
amendment does impose due process limitations upon federal
court assertions of personal jurisdiction.10 7 However, many more
courts have either ignored the issue or chosen not to apply the fifth
amendment. 08 The Supreme Court has declined the opportunity
to resolve the conflict.10
9
The majority of scholars view the fifth amendment as imposing
no limitation upon federal assertions of personal jurisdiction, 10 ex-
cept for a requirement of reasonable and fair notice as defined in
103. Id. at 201.
104. Id. at 203.
105. Id. at 203-04.
106. Id. at 204.
107. See, e.g., Black v. Acme Mkts., Inc., 564 F.2d 681, 686 n.8 (5th Cir. 1977); Fraley v.
Chesapeake & Ohio R.R., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968); Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore
& Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147, 155 (5th Cir. 1954).
108. See, e.g., Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 949 (1982); First Flight Co. v. National Car Loading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730, 736
(E.D. Tenn. 1962).
109. Haile v. Henderson Nat'l Bank, 657 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S.
949 (1982) (issue clearly raised by Judge Keith's dissent); see also United States v.
Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795, 804 n.13 (1948), in which the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he [g]overnment, however, suggests that, in view of our recent decision in Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington ...which was concerned with the jurisdiction of a
state over a foreign corporation for purposes of suit . . . and in view of aspects of
similarity between that problem and the one now presented, we extend to this case
and to § 12 [of the Clayton Act] the criteria there formulated and applied. There is
no necessity for doing so. The facts of the two cases are considerably different and, as
we have said, we are not concerned here with finding the utmost reach of Congress'
power.
110. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co."' Critics, such as
Professor Abraham, argue that the fifth amendment due process
clause does impose some, though indefinite, constitutional limits
on federal service of process. 12 More recently, Professor Currie has
also proposed recognition of such constitutional limitations on per-
sonal jurisdiction.'1 Others, taking a different approach, propose
that existing constitutional objections be dealt with in the context
of limitations on venue provisions, 114 or in Professor Clermont's
view, by creating a constitutional construct, separate but derived
from both personal jurisdiction and venue, called "forum
reasonableness. 1 1 5
The remainder of this article will consider why, in light of the
Supreme Court's evolving view .of the basis for limiting personal
jurisdiction, a fifth amendment due process limitation is com-
pelled. The article will discuss the various forms which such a limi-
tation might take, and will propose a form arguably consistent
with both fourteenth amendment analysis and the special concerns
of a unified federal court system.
IV. TOWARD A NEW FEDERAL STANDARD
Conventional wisdom regarding personal jurisdiction in federal
courts rests upon the notions of sovereignty and territoriality de-
rived from international law, and best articulated by Justice
Field's opinion in Pennoyer v. Neff." 6 From the notion that the
sovereign has jurisdiction over all persons and things within its
borders, the conclusion was reached that the federal government
has no limits in asserting personal jurisdiction within its own bor-
ders. 7 This view was in accord with the European view of juris-
111. 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950). To comply with due process, Mullane requires "notice rea-
sonably calculated ... to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action. . . ." In
addition, the Court defined the right protected by the fifth amendment's due process clause
as the "[o]pportunity to be heard." Id. at 314.
112. See Abraham, supra note 1, at 531-36.
113. See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, Part II, 36 U. CHi.
L. REv. 268, 299-311 (1969).
114. See Barrett, supra note 86, at 627-35 ("There is no constitutional impediment to
Congress treating the entire country as a single jurisdiction and permitting service of pro-
cess anywhere within it."). Id. at 630; see also Seidelson, Jurisdiction of Federal Courts
Hearing Federal Cases: An Examination of the Propriety of the Limitations Imposed by
Venue Restrictions, 37 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 82 (1968).
115. Clermont, supra note 3, at 451-55.
116. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
117. Id. at 722-23.
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diction articulated by Justice Story" 8 and relied upon by Justice
Field in Pennoyer."9
This sovereign/territorial view of personal jurisdiction's basis
was far from universal even at the time of Pennoyer.120 However, if
sovereign/territorial view remained the sole touchstone of personal
jurisdiction, the accepted view of federal power might be justifia-
ble. Since International Shoe, it is clear that the Supreme Court,
in the context of state court assertions of personal jurisdiction, has
abandoned the pure power test and replaced it with a standard
which considers both sovereignty and reasonableness. 2 ' According
to the Court, this two part standard stems from the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 22 No court or commentator
has advanced an adequate or even credible explanation of why
fourteenth amendment due process and fifth amendment due pro-
cess concerns should differ so drastically that the latter would im-
pose no constraints on a federal court's authority to exercise per-
sonal jurisdiction. This is especially puzzling in light of the extent
to which these two clauses parallel each other in other respects.2 3
No one who has carefully considered the subject would suggest
that a federal standard for personal jurisdiction be identical to a
state standard. There are several differences in state and federal
court systems. The most obvious difference is the unitary nature of
the federal court system. 12 4 Moreover, to the extent that sover-
eignty and terrritoriality continue to be concerns in determining
personal jurisdiction, the federal government's sovereign power ex-
tends to its borders. However, similar considerations of reasonable-
ness and fairness seem relevant to federal courts as well as state
courts. The burden of compelling a California resident, with no
connection to New York, to litigate in a New York federal court
clearly parallels the burden upon the same nonresident to litigate
in a New York state court. Why should the California resident
118. J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 19-21 (1834). For a more com-
plete discussion of Story's position, see Hazard, A General Theory of State Court Jurisdic-
tion, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 241, 258-62.
119. 95 U.S. at 722.
120. See Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth
and Forum Non Conveniens, 65 YALE L.J. 289, 293-303 (1956).
121. See supra notes 26-90 and accompanying text.
122. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
123. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80-82 (1972) (discussing procedural due
process requirements of fifth and fourteenth amendments).
124. See generally Foster, Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Federal Courts, 1969 Wis. L. REV. 9
(1969); Green, supra note 86.
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have less constitutional protection because the plaintiff has chosen
a federal forum? Before suggesting a new standard, one should
consider previously offered approaches.
A. Why doesn't Mullane suffice?
Several courts and scholars, while acknowledging a fifth amend-
ment due process requirement imposed upon personal jurisdiction
assertions in federal court, find such requirement met by notice
which complies with the Supreme Court's decision in Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.'2 ' While Mullane certainly
does require federal courts to ensure that interested parties be
given reasonable notice, that case does not address the issue of a
court's power to assert jurisdiction. Rather, it addresses the proce-
dural requirements of asserting such jurisdiction once power ex-
ists.' 26 Therefore, those courts and scholars who see Mullane as
representing the only constitutional concern simply fail to recog-
nize the nature of the inquiry necessary to determine personal ju-
risdiction. That failure could be remedied simply by considering
the role of the reasonable notice requirement in state court pro-
ceedings. A state court cannot cure an assertion of personal juris-
diction which fails to meet the International Shoe "minimum con-
tacts" standard by giving "good" notice.2 Because notice and
minimum contacts must be met in state court, a standard for
federal personal jurisdiction should also incorporate both
requirements.
B. Venue as a Constitutional Safeguard
There are those who have suggested that, rather than revising
the accepted view of personal jurisdiction, courts should address
due process concerns by elevating venue considerations to a consti-
tutional level.'2 8 Professor Edward L. Barrett, Jr., proposed a
scheme of nationwide service of process predicated upon a new
broadened federal venue statute which would deal with all reason-
125. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
126. Id. at 312-15. In Mullane, the Court seems to assume that jurisdictional power over
the nonresidents does exist, although the Court is less than clear in setting forth whether
the basis of that jurisdiction is in rem, or in personam.
127. Nor is the reverse true. "Good" personal jurisdiction in the constitutional sense will
fail for lack of notice. See, e.g., Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982).
128. See Barrett, supra note 86. But see Clermont, supra note 3, at 449.
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ableness and convenience concerns. 119 His scheme would include,
among other things, provisions for liberal transfer of cases. The
previously discussed ALI proposal'30 also retained a scheme which,
with regard to federal question cases, would rely upon venue to
determine the appropriate location for a trial to the exclusion of
any personal jurisdiction standard.' Therefore, venue in federal
court would encompass issues usually designated jurisdictional. Al-
though the ALI does not explain its choice of the venue label
rather than the jurisdiction label to protect constitutional rights, it
may have based its reasoning on concerns over finality of judg-
ments. A default judgment based upon faulty jurisdiction may be
collaterally attacked, while a default judgment based upon faulty
venue generally may not be challenged."'
At first glance, the idea is attractive because venue does concern
issues of convenience and fairness. However, there are several
problems with this approach. First, unlike personal jurisdiction,
venue has not been traditionally viewed as a constitutional require-
ment.' 3 ' Second, although venue does deal with issues of conve-
nience and fairness, the venue provisions address such issues only
generally. That is, venue provisions consider fairness for a class of
litigants or convenience for a category of lawsuits, rather than con-
sidering the fairness or convenience to a particular litigant in a
particular lawsuit."' It has been argued that retention of the
transfer of venue statutes will provide the needed flexibility to en-
sure the most reasonable and fair venue for particular parties in a
particular case." 5 However, it is clear that venue statutes do not,
at least in their present form,"' protect the constitutional rights of
particular parties. For example, consider a case with multiple de-
fendants, several of whom reside in State A, one of whom resides
in State B, while the claim arose in State C. The case is originally
brought in State D, plaintiff's residence, and defendants seek to
transfer it to State A, which appears to be, and which all defen-
dants agree, is the most convenient and fair site in which to liti-
129. Barrett, supra note 86, at 628-30.
130. See ALI STUDY, supra note 86.
131. Id. § 1314.
132. See Currie, supra note 113.
133. See C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 42 (4th ed. 1983).
134. "The distinction must be clearly understood between jurisdiction, which is the power
to adjudicate, and venue, which relates to the place where judicial authority may be exer-
cised, and which is intended for the convenience of the litigants." Id. § 42, at 239.
135. See Barrett, supra note 86, at 630.
136. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404, 1406 (1982).
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gate. The Supreme Court's interpretation of the "where it might
have been brought" language of the transfer statutes13 7 precludes
transfer except to a jurisdiction where all defendants reside or
where the claim arose. This is so even if the nonresident defendant
of State A is willing to waive venue and personal jurisdiction objec-
tions to that forum. 138
Perhaps the most serious objection to superimposing on venue
statutes the new role of protecting due process rights, is that it
seems a tortured and unnecessary exercise in legal obfuscation.
Since the Judiciary Act of 1887, Congress has distinguished be-
tween venue and personal jurisdiction. 39 Developments since 1887
have further separated the concepts of territorial jurisdiction and
venue. 40 Thus, there is a longstanding tradition of treating these
concepts as separate and distinct. The notion of the limits of a
court's constitutional authority or power over a person has been, at
least since Pennoyer, expressed in terms of personal jurisdiction
rather than venue. Venue principally deals with the distribution of
the judicial business of the courts.' 4' It is unnecessary to use venue
to perform the "double-duty" of imposing constitutional limita-
tions on the court's authority over individuals and legislative pref-
erences as to the proper place of suit. Personal jurisdiction con-
cepts already exist to limit the court's constitutionally permissible
authority to deal with the rights of persons, without confusion or
distortion.
C. Is "Forum Reasonableness" the Answer?
Professor Clermont places jurisdiction and venue on opposite
ends of a continuum. 142 He places jurisdictional concerns of sover-
eignty and territoriality at one extreme designated "pure jurisdic-
tion."'14 3 He places venue concerns of efficient distribution of judi-
cial business at the other extreme labeled "mere venue.' 44 As
these concepts approach each other on the continuum, they share
137. Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1960).
138. Id. at 343-44.
139. Judiciary Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552 (codified at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(a)-(b) (1982)).
140. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1397 (1982) (enacting various special venue statutes); FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(f (authorizing statewide service of process).
141. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
142. See Clermont, supra note 3, at 437.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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overlapping constitutional concerns with the fairness and reasona-
bleness of the place of trial. These shared concerns Clermont
would designate "forum reasonableness." 145
Arguably, this analytical structure allows one to view constitu-
tional issues of fairness and reasonableness apart from existing as-
sumptions of proper jurisdiction or venue in a given case. 46 This
structure also allows one to identify "pure jurisdiction" in terms of
territorial affiliating circumstances, to fix venue according to con-
gressional instruction, and to decide whether the chosen forum
meets constitutional standards of fairness and reasonableness.147
To the extent that Professor Clermont recognizes that both state
and federal assertions of personal jurisdiction must be measured
against constitutional due process standards, his analysis is consis-
tent with that of this article.148 To the extent his analysis facili-
tates the examination of due process limitations upon federal
courts' exercise of personal jurisdiction, 149 it-is a helpful and wel-
come one. However, Professor Clermont's analysis rests upon an
underlying assumption which this author does not accept. His po-
sition seems to be that the "forum reasonableness" concept will
reconcile fourteenth amendment due process constraints on state
court personal jurisdiction with fifth amendment due process lim-
its on federal court venue. It is the position of this article that,
because fifth amendment constraints on federal personal jurisdic-
tion parallel those of the fourteenth amendment, no such reconcili-
ation is necessary.
Professor Clermont's analytical framework fails to adequately
address the relevant issues in the context of current Supreme
Court doctrine. For almost thirty years the Supreme Court has in-
cluded the reasonableness of the forum as a component of personal
jurisdiction. 50 The source of the Supreme Court's personal juris-
diction test, for both its territoriality and reasonableness compo-
nents, is the due process clause.' 5' Venue, on the other hand, while
incorporating some convenience and fairness concerns, is not a
145. Id.
146. Id. at 438.
147. Id. at 438-40.
148. Id. at 439.
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 26-90 and accompanying text.
151. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxities De Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982).
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constitutional concept.152 Consistent with the Court's prior treat-
ment of venue and jurisdiction, constitutionally based fairness/rea-
sonableness concerns seem to fall within the sphere of jurisdiction,
not venue. Separating these concerns and labeling them "forum
reasonableness" may aid in their definition and delineation. This
may be the principal benefit of the "forum reasonableness"
approach.
The concern of this article, however, is that issues of fairness
and reasonableness in exercises of personal jurisdiction should be
consistently addressed by federal courts. It is an underlying as-
sumption of the following section that courts will be willing and
able to address these issues in the context of a constitutionally
proven analysis.
D. Proposed Standard
While the recent discussions by courts and commentators have
been helpful in terms of exploring the need for a federal due pro-
cess standard in personal jurisdiction determinations, it is the posi-
tion of this article that the standards thus far proposed fall short
for the reasons previously outlined. 153 Any standard applied by the
federal district courts to solve the problem, must have both a
sound theoretical basis and a practical approach. Much of the
scholarly writing in the personal jurisdiction area reflects academic
wishful thinking in terms of perceived judicial trends away from
territorial concerns toward pure reasonableness concerns. Whether
or not one believes that sovereignty issues have no place in deter-
mining jurisdiction,154 the reality is that the Supreme Court, after
recent consideration, continues to recognize such issues. 55 How-
ever, formulating a due process scheme for federal courts may offer
the chance to engage in the closest thing to a "pure reasonable-
152. Professor Clermont asserts that district courts "adopting as federal common law the
due process limits on state court jurisdiction. . . are in effect, applying this [fairness] con-
stitutional aspect of venue." Clermont, supra note 3, at 435 n.117. But courts clearly believe
they are limiting personal jurisdiction, not venue. See, e.g., Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liq-
uidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
153. See supra notes 125-52 and accompanying text.
154. This author is persuaded that by making use of the reasonableness test alone, courts
could adequately protect not only the rights of the parties involved but the sovereignty
interests of the forum and other jurisdictions. To the extent that the Supreme Court has
refused to move toward the reasonableness of the forum as the sole test of personal jurisdic-
tion, other approaches must be considered.
155. See World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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ness" standard.
In order to facilitate the uniform application of the constitu-
tional standard to be addressed below, congressional action is nec-
essary to revise or abolish existing restrictions rule 4 places upon
the use of a federal standard.'56 The new rule should take the form
of a federal long arm statute, as suggested in detail by Professor
Currie. 157 It may be as simple as language authorizing service of
process to the extent of fifth amendment limitations. A more com-
plex version of the rule could include specific factors to be weighed
in making a personal jurisdiction decision. 158 Such a rule would en-
able the constitutional limits of federal due process to be consist-
ently applied in both diversity and federal question cases. Until
the rules with regard to assertions of federal personal jurisdiction
are changed, the standard outlined below should, nonetheless, ap-
ply in cases in which Congress has prescribed specific rules for ex-
traterritorial service. 1 9
A traditional personal jurisdiction analysis would begin with an
examination of those affiliating circumstances which connect a
nonresident to the forum. The analysis might end at this stage if
insufficient circumstances are found. However, given the nature of
the federal system, certain accommodations must be made in ap-
plying the constitutional analysis to federal courts. Since the sover-
eignty of the United States government extends to its borders, any
defendant residing or engaging in activities within the borders of
the United States will meet the threshold consideration of actual
purposeful contacts with the forum.16 0 It should be made clear at
this point in the analysis that the contacts or affiliating circum-
stances which will meet concerns of a federal personal jurisdiction
standard are contacts with the sovereign, the United States, and
not contacts with the particular state or district within which the
district court is situated. The Oxford First case could be read as
requiring that as a threshold consideration, a defendant be found
to have affiliating circumstances with the state in which the dis-
156. See supra notes 96-109 and accompanying text.
157. See Currie, supra note 113, at 305 (suggesting that federal courts do not require
enabling legislation to assume personal jurisdiction under federal standards); see also Jaftex
Corp. v. Randolph Mills, Inc., 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960), overruled by Arrowsmith v.
United Press Int'l, 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
158. See infra note 163 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
160. See Clermont, supra note 3, at 438.
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trict court is located. 16 1 At least one district court has taken the
position that, in the context of the 100-mile "bulge" provision, the
Constitution requires a defendant to have contacts both in the dis-
trict where the district court sits and in the district within the 100-
mile radius in which service is actually made." 2 This view of the
limits of federal personal jurisdiction is very restrictive and argua-
bly erroneous.
In the usual federal case, defendant's affiliating contacts with
the sovereign will be apparent. However, the existence of such con-
tacts is only the initial consideration. It must also be determined,
with regard to the particular defendant and case involved, whether
it is reasonable for the forum to assert jurisdiction under the fifth
amendment's due process clause. Accordingly, the particular fed-
eral district in which the action is initiated must be considered.
The focus of this inquiry should be, not only upon the conve-
nience to the defendant and the fairness of requiring him to de-
fend in this forum, but also upon consideration of other relevant
factors "including the forum state's interest in adjudicating the
dispute,. . . the plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and ef-
fective relief, . . . at least when that interest is not adequately pro-
tected by the plaintiff's power to choose the forum . . . [and] the
• ..judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient reso-
lution of controversies." " 3 The ultimate purpose of this inquiry
will be to determine whether the forum is a reasonable one. In this
determination an examination of the nature and quality of defen-
dant's contacts with the forum will be a relevant factor. Inconve-
nience factors such as expense to litigate at a particular forum, lo-
cation of witnesses, and situs of discovery proceedings should also
be considered. In addition, the court may consider the availability
of another, perhaps more convenient, forum and the applicable law
in the case.
If this standard were applicable in both federal question and di-
versity cases, it could accommodate the different natures of these
cases. For example, in federal question cases the law applied in the
case would be a neutral factor in the overall reasonableness deter-
mination. However, in a diversity case, given the rule in Klaxon
161. Oxford First Corp., 372 F. Supp. at 203-04.
162. Karlsen v. Hanff, 278 F. Supp. 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Contra Coleman v. American
Export Isbrandtsen Lines Inc., 405 F.2d 250 (2d Cir. 1968).
163. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
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Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., 64 the determina-
tion of which state's law was to be applied would definitely influ-
ence the reasonableness of the forum. Moreover, in a diversity case
in which state substantive laws apply, the relationship between the
events giving rise to the case and the forum state may also be an
important aspect of the determination. Should such a standard ap-
ply only in federal question cases, at least reasonableness determi-
nations in such cases parallel similar determinations under state
law and the fourteenth amendment in diversity cases. 65
Federal district courts in diversity and other cases falling within
rule 4(e), have, in essence, applied such a constitutional standard
since International Shoe. 66 By adopting a federal personal juris-
diction standard based upon the fifth amendment, courts can rule
consistent with their decisions based upon the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. That consistency is supported by both
logic and the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
While commentators and circuit courts continue to abide by the
view that the federal courts suffer no due process constraints on
assertions of personal jurisdiction, some federal district courts have
reached the contrary conclusion. 167 District courts, finding it diffi-
cult to accept that fifth amendment and fourteenth amendment
due process are not consistent and parallel, continue to struggle
with an accepted rule which runs counter to their own notions of
justice and fairplay.168
Those who continue to recite the axiomatic view should recog-
nize that it rests upon an outdated and no longer subscribed to
notion of the primary basis for personal jurisdiction. The sovereign
power to exert jurisdiction over those within its borders is not
questioned. However, in the United States, that sovereign author-
ity, although necessary, should no longer be seen as sufficient to
164. 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (holding that in order to promote uniform application of State
law, a principal goal of Erie, a federal district court in a diversity case must apply the con-
flict-of-law rules of the state in which it is sitting).
165. See supra notes 26-89 and accompanying text.
166. Id.
167. See, e.g., Lone Star Package Car Co. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 212 F.2d 147 (5th
Cir. 1954); Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
168. See supra note 167.
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support personal jurisdiction.16 9 The concept of due process, with
its inherent requirements of fundamental fairness and reasonable-
ness, limits what in other countries might be an unlimited asser-
tion of sovereign power. Arguably, congressional power to provide
for nationwide service of process is consistent with the notion that
the due process clause might impose some restrictions upon exer-
cise of that power, just as due process may restrict the exercise of
any other constitutionally granted congressional power.' 70
The standard proposed by this article for federal exercise of per-
sonal jurisdiction would, in almost all cases, render the defendant
subject to the sovereignty of the federal courts. However, it would
require that a court determine that challenged personal jurisdic-
tion, in a given case, be asserted only if it is reasonable and fair. As
a consequence, assertions of personal jurisdiction would be consis-
tent whether in state court or in the "federal court across the
street.'1'
169. See supra notes 26-89 and accompanying text.
170. The issue, thus, is not whether sovereign power generally extends to the country's
borders, but rather whether in any given case it is reasonable for the sovereign to exercise
that power.
171. Abraham, supra note 1, at 533-34.
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